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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The topic 
 
It is the relationship between the principle of complementarity and national implementation 
of ICC crimes as presented by the Rome Statute and relevant national legislation which 
will be the subject for this paper. 
 
The principle of complementarity is the link connecting the judicial system of the 
International Criminal Court (the Court or the ICC) to each State Party’s national judicial 
system. This principle gives the national legal system primacy over cases of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes1 (ICC crimes). Cases will only be admissible 
before the ICC if the States Parties national judicial system is either unwilling or unable to 
genuinely investigate or prosecute the case.2 The core of the complementarity principle is 
thus the admissibility test determining who should have jurisdiction in a particular case. 
 
The topic of this paper will be raised by analysing the relationship from two angles.  
 
The first angle is how national implementations impact the complementarity principle as 
reflected through the admissibility assessment. The obvious factor is that different national 
implementation strategies will lead to different results in the admissibility test. But this 
angle raises some important questions: What level of implementation is required if the state 
wishes to maintain its jurisdiction and prosecute the case at a national level? And 
                                                 
1 Article 5, the Statute. Article 5(1)(d) also gives the Court jurisdiction over cases concerning crimes of 
aggression. This crime has however as of yet not been given a definition, and will therefore not be dealt with 
in this paper. 
2 Article 17 (1) of the Statute.  
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furthermore, can the state maintain substantive jurisdiction over the ICC crimes even if it 
does not initiate an implement process at all?  
 
The second angle is how the principle of complementarity impacts the national 
implementation processes. The complementary nature of the ICC was established as states 
wanted to secure their national sovereignty.3 This can best be done through securing 
substantive criminal jurisdiction over the ICC crimes. Complementarity is thus a significant 
influence for states when they decide to implement the ICC crimes into national legislation. 
This angle does, however, also raise an important question: Since the complementary 
nature of the Court postulates an active prosecuting role of the States Parties, does it in fact 
imply an obligation to implement the ICC crimes? 
 
The focus of the paper will be on states which have ratified the Rome Statute and wish to 
prosecute and punish offenders of international crimes. The purpose of the paper is to show 
whether these states have to change their national legislation in order to do so. 
 
1.2 Limitation 
 
The paper will apply one important limitation when analysing the described topic.  
 
Whether a case is admissible before the ICC will vary on a number of factors as the 
admissibility test involves a very complex assessment. This paper will isolate one factor of 
the admissibility test, namely the criminal substantive law4 of States Parties as such.  
 
Other questions in regards to implementing the Statute such as procedural aspects will only 
be addressed if it will highlight a specific problem or solution. 
 
                                                 
3 Cassese (2003) page 351 
4 ’Substantive law’ being understood as the crimes defined in Articles 6-8 of the Statute. 
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Some minor limitations will be applied for some parts of the paper. They will be introduced 
where relevant. 
 
1.3 Further structure 
 
Part 2 presents the method of this paper and explains how the problems will be addressed.  
It will also explore the applicable law for interpreting the Rome Statute in addition to 
raising some special problems to these sources in relation to the Statute 
 
Part 3 briefly examines the principle of complementarity and introduces the admissibility 
test set forth by the principle in articles 17 and 20 (3) of the Statute. 
 
Part 4 identifies the different strategies states can choose when implementing the ICC 
crimes into national legislation, namely i) to implement the same definitions as the Rome 
Statute contains, ii) to implement a broader definition than what is included in the Statute, 
iii) to implement a narrower definition than what is included in the Statute and finally iv) 
not to implement the ICC crimes at all. It also analyses how these implementation 
strategies impact the national prosecution of international crimes, and thus presents us with 
two scenarios which the States Parties may experience if they decide to implement a 
narrower definition than included in the Statute, or by not implementing at all: A) the 
prosecute for ordinary crimes scenario, and B) the impossible to prosecute scenario.5 
 
Part 5 analyses the impact national implementations of ICC crimes will have upon the 
admissibility before the Court. This will be illustrated through applying the same 
admissibility test as the Court eventually will have to do, upon the different scenarios of 
national prosecution of the ICC crimes as presented in part 4.  
 
                                                 
5 Terracino (2007) 
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Part 6 analyses the impact the complementary nature of the ICC has upon the process of 
national implementation. First, by discussing how the principle of complementarity acts as 
an incentive for states to implement the ICC crimes. Then by assessing whether 
complementarity provides a legal obligation for States Parties to implement the ICC 
crimes. The scenarios presented in part 4 will be relevant as a basis for this part also. 
 
It must be noted that despite the fact that part 5 and part 6 discuss different bases, the 
separation is an artificial one. The impact complementarity has upon national 
implementation of ICC crimes is essential to the impact national implementation of ICC 
crimes has upon admissibility before the ICC and vice versa. In fact, they explain each 
other and belong together as one subject. When I still choose to discuss them separately in 
this paper, it is because both sides deserve to be highlighted and this is done more 
effectively through this separation. This strategy has, however, forced me to discuss 
subjects prior to where they otherwise would be more naturally dealt with in order to make 
the paper coherent. 
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2 Method of the paper and applicable law 
 
2.1 Method of the paper 
 
The discussion of this paper will primarily be based upon an analysis of the preambular 
clauses and article 1 of the Statute where the principle of complementarity is set out and 
articles 17 and 20 of the Statute where the principle is put into effect. While the Statute 
exists in six equally authentic versions, this paper will only refer to the English version. 
 
The relevant rules of the Statute will be interpreted according to the principles set forth by 
article 21 of the Statue as well as the general principles of treaty interpretation as codified 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). These are the 
same sources and principles as the Court will apply when determining the admissibility of a 
case pursuant to articles 17 and 20 of the Statute. This is especially important in part 5 of 
this paper where I am going to apply the admissibility test for certain scenarios, and thus 
give my opinion of what conclusion the Court should reach when equal scenarios reach the 
Court. These are also the same principles as must be applied when establishing what 
obligations a States Party has incurred by ratifying the Statute in part 6.2.   
 
2.2 Applicable law 
 
International criminal law is a subset of international law, and its sources are therefore 
those of international law. These are usually considered to be those enumerated in 38 (1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. All the ad hoc tribunals have used the 
sources of law as provided there. 6  As for the ICC, however, the Statute contains its own 
set of sources for the Court to apply in article 21. 
 
                                                 
6 Cryer, (2007 A) page 6 
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Article 21 lists the applicable law in a hierarchical order starting with the “Statute, elements 
of crimes and its rules on procedure of evidence”.7 The Statute exists in six language 
versions, which are all authoritative for the purpose of interpretation.8 In the Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concession Case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to interpret the 
phrases ‘public control’ and ‘contrôle public’ in the French and English authentic 
languages texts of the Palestine Mandate. The Court said:  
 
“Where two versions possessing equal authority exist one of which appears to have a 
wider bearing than the other, it is bound to adopt the more limited interpretation 
which can be made to harmonise with both versions and which, as far as it goes, is 
doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the parties.”9 
 
The same would apply if there was a discrepancy in the meaning of the wording of the 
Statutes. 
 
As written instruments of international law, the Statute must be interpreted in accordance 
with articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. Article 5 of this convention provides that it 
“applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization”. 
Furthermore, the Statute’s article 21 (1) (b) provides that the second tier in the hierarchy of 
applicable law is “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law”. The 
principles of treaty interpretation set forth by the Vienna Convention will therefore be 
relevant for both the ICC itself and the States Parties.10  
 
Articles 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention lists the three essential aspects of treaty 
interpretation: the interpretation shall at one time be literal (“the ordinary meaning”), 
contextual (“in their context”) and teleological (“in light of its object and purpose”).11 The 
                                                 
7 Article 21 (1) (a) cf. article 51 (5) of he Statute. 
8 Article 128 of the Statute 
9 Evans (2003) 
10 Stigen, (2005) page 16 
11 Stigen (2005) page 16. 
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preambular clauses will be relevant when establishing both the context and the object of the 
treaty pursuant to article 31 (2) of the Vienna Conventions. 
 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention lists the preparatory work as a “supplementary means 
of interpretation”. Such documents must, however, be used carefully as the Rome Statute 
was made through a process including almost all the states of the world, but at different 
levels, and there is no authorised collection of the preparatory work.  
 
The third tier in the hierarchy of applicable law is, according to the Statute’s article 21 (1) 
(c), “general principles of law derived (…) from national law”. This is very important as 
the complementarity regime of ICC implies that the majority of cases will be prosecuted by 
the States Parties and never come before the Court. The Court must, however, be very 
cautious when applying national sources, as international law in domestic cases will be 
affected by the national method of law. 
 
The Statute then goes on to include its previous decisions in the Statute’s article 21 (2) as 
applicable law. The ICC is not, however, bound by its previous decisions.12  As of today, 
the ICC has yet to pronounce its first decision applying the complementarity principle.13 
However, article 21 (3) states that the applicable sources of law, will only be relevant as 
long as it is consistent with the internationally recognized human rights. This will render 
the jurisprudence from international human rights courts applicable when interpreting the 
Statute. I will thus apply jurisprudence in related fields of international law, especially 
human rights law.  
 
Finally, the establishment of the International Criminal Court has caused the publication of 
a considerable amount of books and articles. Some of these writings deal with the principle 
of complementarity, and several has touched upon the problems discussed in this paper. 
Also, several articles deal with the national implementation of the ICC crimes, although 
                                                 
12 It has no equivalent to the common law principle of stare decisis. Cryer (2007 A) page 9 
13 The first case before the ICC will commence 31st of March 2008, when Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo will be 
prosecuted. http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/301.html 
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few of them touch upon the problems discussed in this paper. The scholars do, however, 
differ on various topics which I will discuss in this paper.   
 
Writings of scholars are not, in themselves, sources of international criminal law, and 
especially not in areas concerning the principle of legality of crimes.14 Still, arguments 
presented with valid reasoning must always be considered before coming to a conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Cryer (2007 A) page 9. 
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3 The principle of complementarity 
 
I will now briefly present the principle of complementarity as a fair knowledge of it is 
imperative to for the understanding of the rest of the paper. 
 
This ‘principle of complementarity’ of the ICC is emphasised and established through 
paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 1 of the Statute while it is put into effect by article 
17. The complementary nature of the Court must also be seen in relation to article 20 (3) of 
the Statute which deals with the ne bis in idem15 principle. 
 
Article 17 of the Statute renders a case, which is being or has been investigated and/or 
prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction, inadmissible before the Court unless the state is 
either unwilling or unable to proceed genuinely.16 Hence national legal system hold 
primacy over cases of ICC crimes, but the national proceedings need to pass the 
admissibility test pursuant to article 17. Only if the State fails this admissibility test, will 
the Court be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the case. 
 
Thus, the admissibility test is the core of the complementarity principle. It is however, just 
one of three tests a case will need to pass in order for the ICC to be able to preside over the 
case. The first requirement is that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Statute defined 
in article 5 and article 12 of the Statute as one of the aforementioned ICC crimes. The 
second requirement is that of admissibility17 while the third is the issue of prosecutorial 
discretion regulated in article 53 of the Statute.18  
 
                                                 
15 Also referred to as ‘double jeopardy’. A principle established to prevent the same person from being 
prosecuted twice for the same conduct. I will analyse this more thoroughly in part 5.4. 
16 Article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute. 
17 I will apply the admissibility test for certain scenarios in part 5, and will therefore not go into further detail 
on the subject at the present stage. 
18 This thesis will only look into the complementary requirement.  
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Under the complementarity principle, international proceedings will co-exist, rather than 
pre-empt, with national mechanism already in existence.19 Unlike its predecessors, the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR),20 the ICC preserves national criminal jurisdiction as primary, and only supplement 
the domestic proceedings.  
 
If all States strive to avoid failing the admissibility test, which depends upon the 
willingness and ability of a State, the complementary nature of the Court could in fact lead 
to no cases being admissible before the Court. In such a situation, the States would, in 
principle, maintain their sovereignty as all the cases were handled by national courts.21 
 
Nevertheless, pursuant to article 17 of the Statute, a State Party has accepted that unless it 
provides legal jurisdiction over the ICC crimes within its own judicial system, and no other 
State with jurisdiction is willing or able to genuinely investigate or prosecute the case, ICC 
crimes committed on its territory and by its citizens will be prosecuted by the Court.  
 
Most states that have ratified the Statute have thus either enacted some form of 
implementation of the ICC crimes, or have some draft to implement these crimes into their 
national legislation pending in their legislature process.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Bekou (2006) 
20 See article 9 (2) of the ICTY statute and article 8 (2) of the ICTR statute. 
21 Holmes (2002). However, the history, both long-term and short-term, indicates that there is a need for a 
permanent international criminal court. See for instance the four current situations before the Court. 
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4 National Implementation of ICC Crimes 
 
In this part I will show to what extent, and how, states have implemented the ICC crimes. I 
will also show what scenarios will arise when a state wishes to institute national 
proceedings against alleged perpetrators of ICC crimes according to its chosen 
implementation strategy.  
 
The national definitions of the implemented crimes will have an impact on the states own 
ability to carry out prosecutions for the ICC crimes. In turn, these will also have an impact 
on the result of the complementarity assessment as it will influence the admissibility test. 
However, it must be noted that there is not necessarily a connection between a lacking 
implementation of ICC crimes, and the admissibility before the Court. States Parties could 
hold the most meticulous national criminal systems, and still not implement the ICC 
crimes. Whether this would make the case admissible before the Court would still vary on a 
number of issues.22  
 
Prior to the drafting of the Rome Statute in 1998, few states had labelled criminal conduct 
in the penal codes with the terms ‘genocide’, ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’. 
Furthermore, the few states that had defined these crimes in their penal provisions had 
defined them individually so there was little uniformity.  
 
Today, 73 of the 105 states that have ratified the Statute have either implemented, or begun 
implementing some parts of the Statute into their domestic legislation. Of these states, all 
but Mexico, Japan, Austria, Latvia and Romania have included the substantive law in their 
implantation process.23  
 
                                                 
22 The relationship between implemented ICC crimes and national prosecution will be raised in this part of 
the paper, while part 5 will discuss the relationship between national implementation and admissibility before 
the Court. 
23 Amnesty International (2006) 
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Implementing internationally defined crimes into national legislation is, however, not an 
easy task. States will have to make the implemented legislation compatible with their 
sometimes complex national criminal justice system while also making their already 
existing legislation compatible with the Statute. The implementation process might also be 
further complicated by the political fluctuations of a state. Italy is one example of a state 
that has not enacted its implementing legislation yet due to both constitutional issues as 
well as political concerns.24 
 
States have therefore found it necessary to take individual approaches in their 
implementation process. Only by doing this will they be able to take into account the 
particularities of their own national judicial system and hence, not disrupt the procedures 
that are already familiar to their populations and court officials. The final legislation will 
therefore still deviate from State Party to State Party. It is, however, believed that the 
definitions of ‘war crimes’, ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ provided for in the 
Statute will ultimately lead to a more uniform set of definitions for all states. 
 
Studies into national implementation processes show that some States Parties have not yet 
begun implementing the ICC crimes into their national legislation. Furthermore, some of 
the states that have implemented the ICC crimes into their national legislation have defined 
the crimes with differently definitions from the Statute. There are examples of states that 
have made the definitions both broader and narrower.  
 
In the following presentation I will analyse the four possible implementation strategies 
states can choose: Either they implement the same definition of ICC crimes as provided for 
in the Statute (4.1); they implement a definition of the ICC crimes in their national 
legislation which is broader than the provided for in the Statute (4.2); they implement a 
definition of the ICC crimes in their legislation which is narrower than the one provided for 
in the Statute (4.3); or they decide not to implement the ICC crimes at all. 
 
                                                 
24 Marco Roscini (2007) 
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As I will show through my examples, a state may of course implement a broader definition 
for one ICC crime and a narrower definition for another ICC crime or even define the same 
ICC crime broader in one area and narrower in the other. 
 
 
4.1 The same definition of ICC crimes in domestic law 
 
Several States Parties have criminalized the ICC crimes in their domestic legislation in the 
identical terms as provided by the Statute; either verbatim in their own penal code (e.g. 
Belgium25 and the Netherlands26), or by including the Statute or parts of it in their 
implementing legislation as annexes or schedules (e.g. United Kingdom27, Australia28 and 
South Africa29).  
 
States may only prosecute perpetrators in their national judicial systems to the extent they 
hold jurisdiction. The boundaries for a state’s substantive jurisdiction may vary according 
to their judicial system. However, the absolute majority of states today base their criminal 
law on the doctrine of strict legality of crimes,30 meaning that that a person may only be 
held criminally liable if, at the moment he committed a certain act, the act was regarded as 
a criminal offences in written law, namely legislation enacted by Parliament, and not in 
customary rules or secondary legislation such as a treaty .31  The state’s substantive 
jurisdiction is therefore limited to what it regards as criminal offences (usually in the state’s 
penal code) before the act is committed. It is debated whether this principle is a part of 
international customary criminal law, but it is often written in the constitution of a state. 
Section 96 of the Norwegian Constitution and the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (EHRC) article 7-1 both embodies this principle. 
                                                 
25 Vandermeersch, (2007) 
26 Sluiter (2004) 
27 Cryer (2007 B) 
28 Boas (2004) 
29 du Plessis (2007) 
30 I will assume that all States Parties apply this principle for the rest of the paper. 
31 Cassese (2003) Page 141. The principle is also known as nullum crimen sine lege 
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 The European Court of Human Rights has issued several judgements on this principle after 
it first established that it was embodied in the EHRC article 7-1 in the Kokkinakis case.32 
This principle has through the ECHR’s jurisprudence been interpreted so that the state can 
only convict a person if, “the individual could know from the wording of the relevant 
provision what acts and omissions would make him criminally liable”.33 In other words, 
the offences must be clearly defined by relevant law. 
 
Hence, states which apply the principle of strict legality of crimes will only hold 
substantive jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the perpetrator if they have criminalized 
the act in its domestic legislation. The same definition of the ICC crimes in domestic law 
and in the Statute will therefore, in principle, not pose any difficulty to national 
prosecutions as the state would prosecute for the same crime as the ICC would have had. 
This is a desirable situation, but, as I will come back to in part 5, it does not necessarily 
reflect the willingness of the state to genuinely investigate or prosecute in a particular case. 
Also cases prosecuted by a States Party which has implemented the ICC crimes word for 
word, might therefore be admissible before the Court pursuant to article 17 of the Statute. 
 
Furthermore, when employing the international crimes in a trial, the national courts may 
interpret the terms more broadly or more narrowly than what the International Criminal 
Court and other states’ courts do, even if the definitions are the same.  
 
One example of where the definition in practice could become narrower or broader is in 
England and Wales where the UK ICC Act Section 50 (4) provides that the ICC Statute 
“shall be construed subject to” British treaty practice. In fact, Section 50 (5) of the same act 
seems to mandate that, while British courts should take decisions made by the ICC “into 
account”, they should nevertheless give preference to reservations or declarations made by 
the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Section 56 (1) of the UK ICC Act provides that “in 
                                                 
32 ECHR case of Kokkinakis v. Greece 25. May 1993 para. 52 
33 ECHR case of Achour v. France, 29. March 2006, para 41. 
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determining whether an offence under this part has been committed, the Court shall apply 
the principles of the law of England and Wales”.34 These injunctions may lead to divergent 
results in British courts as opposed to the ICC. Other States Parties might have similar 
provisions. 
 
Part 4.2 and 4.3 of this Paper will explore the possible consequences for national 
prosecutions as a result of defining a crime broader or more restrictive than provided for in 
the Statute These situations will also include where a state interpret its definitions broader 
or more restrictively.  
 
 
4.2 A broader definition of ICC crimes in domestic law 
 
When states define the ICC crimes in broader terms than the Rome Statute, this might be 
because the state in question unsuccessfully advocated for that act to be included in the 
Statute during the Rome Conference.  
 
Studies into national implementation of ICC crimes have shown that especially war crimes 
have been given broader definitions in national legislation compared to the Statute.35 One 
such example is Belgium which has included several definitions of war crimes that are 
broader than those in the Rome Statute. This includes omitting one requirement that exists 
in the Statute, namely that the crime of physical mutilation and medical and scientific 
experiments must cause death; they only need to compromise health.36 Another example is 
that several states have included the act of inflicting starvation on civilian populations as a 
method of warfare in non-international armed conflicts as a war crime in their enacted or 
draft implementation.37 
                                                 
34 Cryer (2007 B) 
35 Amnesty International (2004) 
36 Amnesty International (2004) 
37 Terracino (2007) 
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 There are also examples of broader definitions of the other crimes. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) has adopted a broader definition of crimes against humanity 
compared to article 7 of the Statute. The DRC defines apartheid as institutionalised 
oppression and domination not just on racial grounds, but also on political, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, sexist and other grounds. Hence, several more conducts will constitute a 
violation of crimes against humanity in their national judicial system.38  
 
An example of a broader definition of genocide is found in Costa Rica which has included 
‘political groups’ to the list of protected groups in its definition for genocide.39 Peru has 
also made its definition of genocide broader by including ‘social groups’ to its list of 
protected groups.40 
 
Naturally, a broader definition of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes in the 
domestic legislation implies that an act that would not constitute a crime under the Statute 
may amount to a crime in the national context. It is the sovereign prerogative of every state 
to enact whatever criminal laws it consider appropriate, consistently with international 
human rights standards, and considering the fact that the ICC crimes were diluted during 
the negotiations,41 a broader definition of international crimes in domestic legislation 
should largely be considered welcome.42 
 
 
4.3 A restrictive definition of ICC crimes in domestic law 
 
                                                 
38 Amnesty International (2004) 
39 Relva (2003) 
40 Relva (2003) 
41 Terracino (2007) 
42 However, where States Parties introduce universal jurisdiction t their judicial system, a broader 
implemented legislation might compromise the principle of legality as well as other States sovereignty. The 
question of universal jurisdiction, however, falls outside the definition of this paper and will not be dealt with 
any further. 
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Some States Parties have implemented the ICC crimes, but in the process decided to define 
the crimes in a ‘weaker’ form. They have thus established a more restrictive definition of 
the crimes than what the Statute has established. 
 
One example is the Portuguese implementation of genocide. To cause “serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group” is according to article 6 b) of the Statute an act of 
genocide. This act has been omitted in the Portuguese provision.43  
 
Restrictive definitions of international crimes in domestic law may also occur in situations 
where states, prior to the drafting of the Statute, had criminalized behaviour as either 
‘genocide’, ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’. If these definitions, which have 
been maintained, are narrower than the ones found in the Statute, the ICC crimes will be 
more restrictively defined. 
 
One example of this is France where the current definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
under article 212-1 of its Criminal Code omits the acts of extermination, imprisonment , 
severe deprivation of physical liberty, rape, sexual crimes, persecution and apartheid, all of 
which are included under the ICC Statute. France is, however currently in the process of 
implementing these mentioned acts in their penal code to solve this discrepancy.44 
 
Another example of a more restrictive definition of the ICC crimes in national legislation is 
the situation in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru where the current definitions of genocide do 
not protect ‘racial groups’.45  
 
A restrictive definition does not necessarily cause difficulty in the national proceedings. As 
long as the act committed by the perpetrator falls within the definition of the international 
crime contained in the national legislation, the state is able to prosecute regardless of the 
restrictive definition. If, however, a state wishes to prosecute an act falling within the 
                                                 
43 Amnesty International (2004) 
44 Terracino (2007) 
45 Relva (2003) 
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definition of an ICC Crime as defined in the Statute, but outside the definition of the same 
crime in the national legislation, the principle of legality of crimes prevents the State from 
prosecuting for the international crime. The state will then be faced with one of two 
situations: either the state can prosecute for an ‘ordinary crime’ which is violated, or the 
conduct is not criminalized at all and it is impossible for the state to prosecute. I will 
present these scenarios in the following under sub-sections A) and B). I will also use these 
scenarios throughout the remainder of the paper as they serve to illustrate the relationship 
between national implementation of ICC crimes and the principle of complementarity from 
both angles. 
 
A.  Prosecute for ordinary crimes 
 
The scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary crime instead of ‘genocide’, ‘war 
crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ may arise in two slightly different situations.  The 
first is where the state decides to prosecute for an ordinary crime instead of not prosecuting 
at all. The second situation where this scenario may arise is where a prosecution for an 
international crime is carried out, but due to the more restrictive definition in the domestic 
legislation, the accused is found innocent of the ICC crime, but guilty of an ordinary crime.  
 
An example here: if Portugal prosecutes a person for having caused serious bodily harm to 
members of a religious group with the intent to destroy the group. It may find that while the 
crime would amount to genocide under the Rome Statute, it falls outside the Portuguese 
definition of genocide. The Portuguese courts may instead find the accused guilty of assault 
and battery. 
 
The essential trait of this scenario is that while the conduct described in the ICC crime is 
criminalized nationally, it is criminalized under a different label with all that might include, 
such as lower punishment, less stigmatic, the criminal liability is limited in time etc. 
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It is worth mentioning that the same scenario may arise in other ways also. There could, for 
example, be situations where a state’s prosecutor decides to prosecute for the ordinary 
crime rather than the adequately implemented ICC crime, and thus render the court unable 
to convict for the ICC crime. The prosecutor could decide to do this due to procedural 
concerns such as problems achieving the required standard of proof. These situations will, 
however, not arise due to the state’s choice of implementation strategy as they apply for all 
prosecution, and falls outside the scope of this paper. 
 
 B.  Impossible to prosecute 
 
In the scenario where it is impossible to prosecute, the act committed by the alleged 
perpetrator is not criminalized at all in the state’s national legislation. As the principle of 
legality grants a state the opportunity to prosecute and punish the perpetrator of a particular 
act which is clearly criminalized, it equally prevents a national court from punishing a 
person for a conduct which was not criminalized at the time the act was committed. The 
states which encounter this scenario will therefore decide not to prosecute for the accused 
crime.  
 
This scenario may arise if France faces a situation where a person has transported or 
transferred civilians. This is a conduct which fall under the definition of war crimes in the 
Statute’s article 8 (2) (a) (vii), but is not included as a war crime in the current French 
legislation.46 
 
It is important to note, for future references in this paper, that this scenario postulates that 
the state has carried out a thorough and genuine investigation into the particular case and 
wishes to prosecute the alleged perpetrator. The only reason it does not prosecute is that it 
lacks substantive jurisdiction, due to its restrictive definition of the ICC crimes in its 
substantive law. This scenario must therefore be kept separate from a scenario where the 
                                                 
46 Terracino (2007) 
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state remains completely inactive (with or without either ordinary crimes or ICC crimes in 
its legislation), which will impact the admissibility assessment differently.  
 
 
4.4 No definition of ICC crimes in domestic law 
 
There are still a number of States Parties which have not yet implemented the ICC crimes 
into their national legislation. A state with no definition of international crimes in its 
national criminal law wishing to prosecute such crimes will face the same two scenarios 
mentioned earlier. 
 
A.  Prosecute for ordinary crimes 
 
The first, and most probable, scenario that a state with no definition of the ICC crimes in is 
national legislation may face, is the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary 
crime instead of ‘genocide’, ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’.  
 
As the state has not implemented the ICC crimes in its national legislation, it may only 
prosecute the accused for ordinary crimes. For example, Norway does not define genocide 
in its internal laws, but it could instead prosecute a person for the act of murder which is 
criminalized under Section 233 of the Norwegian Criminal Code. 
 
B.  Impossible to prosecute 
 
Even if the state wants to prosecute, it may have to declare an impossibility to prosecute 
due to the absence of necessary national legislation and thus lacking jurisdiction. It is hard 
to ascertain when this scenario will arise as there is little or no jurisprudence on the area.  
 
It is, however, hard to imagine that all States Parties will have an ordinary crime in their 
legislation which cover all the conducts defined as ‘war crimes’ in article 8 of the Statute. 
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For example, the acts of making improper use of the military uniform of the enemy, 
declaring that no quarter will be given, employing poisonous weapons and using children 
in hostilities in an international armed conflict are all considered war crimes by the Statute. 
Unless states have criminalized such conduct in an ordinary crime, the state will find it 
impossible to prosecute and fall under this scenario. 
 
That being said, the case will only be admissible before the ICC if it holds ‘sufficient 
gravity’.47 So a violation of one of these ICC crimes may in fact fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, and still not be considered admissible before the Court regardless of the 
state’s willingness and ability to prosecute. 
 
 
I will employ these scenarios in part 5 and 6 when determining the impact national 
implementation has upon the admissibility test and the impact complementarity has upon 
the process of national implementation respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute. I will not discuss this part of the admissibility assessment later in the paper. 
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5 The Impact of National Implementation on Complementarity 
 
In the previous part I presented different strategies for implementing the ICC crimes. I will 
now look into the significance of these various forms of implementation and non-
implementation with regard to the question of admissibility. 
 
I will do this by applying the admissibility test as provided by article 17 and 20 (3) of the 
Statute upon the different scenarios presented in part 4. This will show the national 
implementation of ICC crimes impact the result of a complementarity assessment. 
 
Article 17 (1) reads as follows: 
 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute; 
 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for the conduct which 
is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted 
under article 20, paragraph 3; 
 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court. 
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By applying the admissibility test upon the scenarios presented in both part 4.3 and 4.4 (the 
scenario where states prosecute for ordinary crimes and the scenario where it is impossible 
for the state to prosecute), I will be able to see how lacking implementation impacts the 
admissibility assessment. Adequate implementation as presented in 4.1 and 4.2 will, as 
such, not cause any problems with the admissibility assessment. These implementation 
strategies will thus not be dealt with further in this paper. 
 
Applying the admissibility test upon the scenario where the state finds it impossible to 
prosecute will show if a case which has been investigated genuinely, but not prosecuted 
due to the domestic absence of a criminal definition, is admissible before the Court. 
 
Applying the admissibility test upon the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary 
crime will show if a case which has been prosecuted, but not as an ICC crime in the 
national judicial system, is admissible before the Court. This assessment will also show 
whether it would violate the principle of ne bis in idem as provided for in article 20(3) to 
admit a case before the Court, if a state has prosecuted and convicted or acquitted the 
perpetrator, but for an ordinary crime instead of an international crime.  
 
Article 17 is constructed so that it provides a number of inadmissibility criteria, meaning 
that only situations covered by the exceptions expressly listed in article 17 can be admitted 
before the Court. This approach contrasts the practice of other international courts48, and 
has the direct effect that it is the state that has to challenge the admissibility of a case. In 
other international courts, the general rule is that it is up to the party bringing the claim to 
prove that the claim meets the admissibility criteria.49 However, the ICC is able to admit a 
case and subsequently the burden is on the state challenging the admissibility of the case to 
prove that the case falls under one of the inadmissibility grounds enlisted under article 17. 
The burden of proof will then be turned to the ICC prosecutor to prove that the case does 
                                                 
48 See for example the admissibility criteria of the ECHR Art 35. 
49 The Prosecutor must always assess the admissibility ex officio, and in some situations the prosecutor will 
have to demonstrate the admissibility to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
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not fall under any of the exceptions contained in the article. The burden of proof may be 
turned if the state does not comply with the prosecutors request for information.  
 
In applying the admissibility test my discussion will be based on the fact that the 
hypothetical case holds the ‘sufficient gravity’ as required by article 17 (1) (d). The focus 
of the analysis will therefore be on the issues reflected in articles 17 (1) (a), (b) and (c) and 
20 (3). 
 
As article 17 (1) exhaustively lists the inadmissibility grounds, any other circumstance will 
mean that the case is admissible. We can thus safely conclude that a case will always be 
admissible before the ICC if: 
 
(i) the state that has jurisdiction over the case is unable or unwilling to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute; 
(ii) the state has investigated the case, but due to its unwillingness or inability has 
decided not to prosecute the alleged perpetrator or;  
(iii) the alleged perpetrator has already been tried by another court for the same 
conduct subject to the exceptions provided in article 20 (3). 
 
These are the explicit exceptions from the inadmissibility criteria listed in article 17 (1). 
From these three assumptions we are able to extract four central concepts which are central 
to the admissibility test and the complementary nature of the Court. These are: (i) genuine 
proceedings; (ii) unwillingness; (iii) inability and (iv) ne bis in idem. I will apply them in 
the following as they set the standards of the admissibility assessment 
 
I will also note that a case referred to the Court where the State with jurisdiction has 
remained completely inactive will always be admissible before the Court regardless of the 
further assessment of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’.50 The situation of national inaction 
does not, however, derive from the national implementation of ICC crimes and thus falls 
                                                 
50 Stigen (205) page 149-151 
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outside the scope of this paper. The admissibility test will only be applied if there is a 
conflict of jurisdictions.51 National inactivity will not constitute such a conflict while the 
two scenarios will. 
 
5.1 Genuine proceedings 
 
The complementarity principle requires that states investigate and prosecute any particular 
case ‘genuinely’ to prevent the ICC from taking over the case. ‘Genuinely’ is the key 
determining factor for establishing inadmissibility as there will be no need for the Court to 
step in as long as genuine proceedings are taking place as opposed to any proceeding. Nor 
will the Court be able to admit a case which is investigated or prosecuted genuinely. It is 
therefore as much a limitation upon the exercise of the ICC as it is a requirement for the 
States Parties. ‘Genuinely’ is however not defined in the Statute. 
 
A variance in different states criminal proceedings must be acknowledged. The 
complementarity principle therefore grants states a considerable margin of appreciation as 
to how they carry out their proceedings.52 The term ‘genuine’ qualifies national 
proceedings as objectively as possible, and it was chosen with the intent to avoid subjective 
assessments of national proceedings that would result in lowering the threshold for the 
admissibility of a case by the ICC.53 
 
However, the inadmissibility test will never solely depend upon whether the investigation 
or prosecution is carried out genuinely. In fact, the admissibility test will be on the basis of 
the unwillingness or inability of the state to carry out genuine proceedings. In article 17, the 
‘genuinely’ criterion is inextricably attached to the unwillingness and inability criteria. 
Hence, the standard of ‘genuineness’ of the proceedings must be interpreted in relation to 
                                                 
51 Holmes (2002) page 673. 
52 Stigen (2005) page 106 
53 Terracino (2007) 
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‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’. Once unwillingness or inability of a state to investigate or 
prosecute is established, the non-genuineness of the proceedings will follow.  
 
Pursuant to article 17, the non-genuineness can therefore only be ascertained after having 
determined either inability or unwillingness. I will therefore move on to analyse the notions 
of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ in order to determine whether the scenarios previously 
discussed amount to a non-genuine investigation or prosecution. 
 
 
5.2 Unwillingness 
 
A definition54 of ‘unwillingness’ is provided in article 17 (2) which lists up three factors. 
The occurrence of one of these factors will imply that the state is unwilling to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute the alleged perpetrator. All the conditions require an intent from 
the state to shield the accused perpetrator. To prove a national intent is very difficult, and 
the criteria has thus been criticised for setting too high standards. I will, however, not be 
impossible, and legal theory has suggested that we should look for a “sham trial” when 
establishing admissibility on this criterion.55  
 
Article 17 (2) reads as follows: 
 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international 
law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
 
                                                 
54 The Statute does not call article 17 (2) a definition, but the overriding consensus among scholars seem to be 
that the list of factors in 17 (2) is exhaustive. See Stigen (2005) page 116-117 with further references. If the 
list is exhaustive, it will also work as a definition. Holmes (2002) does not see this as a definition, but rather 
three quite broad alternative conditions. 
55 Holmes (2002) 
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(a) The proceedings were r are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
referred to in article 5; 
 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned o 
justice; 
 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently 
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in 
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice. 
 
The first situation which is stipulated under subparagraph (a) refers to investigations or 
proceedings conducted for the purpose of shielding the alleged perpetrator. The second 
situation which is stipulated under subparagraph (b) deals with proceedings which have 
been unjustifiably delayed, where the delay is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
alleged perpetrator to justice. The third situation which is stipulated under subparagraph (c) 
concerns proceedings that are not being conducted independently or impartially when this 
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the alleged perpetrator to justice.    
 
Article 17 (1) and 19 (1) state that it is the Court itself that determines whether a given case 
is admissible. When the ICC determines the unwillingness of a state to genuinely 
prosecute, the Court passes a judgement on national judicial systems and proceedings. 
Establishing unwillingness will never be an easy task, and it might be politically sensitive 
as the determination of the Court will amount to an accusation against the state in question. 
Article 17 (2) was introduced to address the concern that the ‘unwillingness’ term was too 
subjective and might lead to arbitrary decisions by the Court. The factors stated in article 
17 (2) are intended to add some objectivity to the decision. 
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 Regarding the two scenarios presented in part 4, namely the scenario where it is impossible 
to prosecute and the scenario where a state prosecutes for an ordinary crime, the 
unwillingness criterion must be examined on two levels.  
 
On the first level, it could be argued that because a state has not implemented the ICC 
crimes adequately into their national legislation, this alone would constitute, or at least 
indicate, unwillingness to genuinely investigate or prosecute. The reasoning would be that 
if the state has not criminalized conduct amounting to an international crime, there has not 
been sufficient will within the state. The unwillingness would, in other words, occur at the 
implementation (or non-implementation) stage. 
 
This view must be dismissed for several reasons. First of all, article 17 (1) and (2) refer to 
national investigations and prosecutions. It is at that phase and not before that the Court has 
to analyse whether there is an unwillingness on behalf of the state. Furthermore, article 17 
(2) provides that the Court shall “determine unwillingness in a particular case”. This clearly 
means that the Court has to determine unwillingness in the specific case. It can not 
establish that a state has an unwillingness to genuinely investigate or prosecute in broader 
terms.  
 
The rationale behind this is that the term ‘unwillingness’ in article 17 is reserved for a 
qualified degree of unwillingness. Only in situations where a state is positively determined 
to shield the particular perpetrator will the term come to use.56 Even if the Court finds a 
general unwillingness with respect to a specific state, it will still have to look for evidence 
of unwillingness in every particular case. This is an important feature of the admissibility 
regime.57 
 
                                                 
56 Stigen (2005) page 114 
57 Terracino (2007) 
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A second reason why this first assertion of unwillingness cannot be accepted is that the 
process of national implementation of international crimes is complex and necessarily 
varies from state to state. There might be a number of reasons, including legal traditions 
and political considerations, as to why a state has not implemented the ICC crimes at all, or 
in a weaker form. To conclude automatically that a state is unwilling to bring the 
perpetrator of an international crime to justice would thus be wrong.  
 
We must therefore move on to the second level of analysis, and study whether the scenarios 
where it is impossible for the state to prosecute, or only possible to prosecute for an 
ordinary crime will amount to a state’s unwillingness to genuinely investigate or prosecute 
in a particular case. As the factors to determine unwillingness in article 17 (2) are 
exhaustive, the two scenarios would have to amount to one of the situations set forth in (a), 
(b) or (c) to be considered a situation of unwillingness, and thus lead to admissibility before 
the Court. 
 
The situations listed in article 17 (2) (b) and (c) can quickly be ruled out. These require an 
unjustified delay or a lack of impartiality and independence in the proceedings. In the 
scenario where it is impossible to prosecute, the state declares that it will not commence a 
prosecution whereas the situations under article 17 (2) (b) and (c) concern proceedings that 
are either under way or have taken place already. As for the scenario where the state 
prosecutes for an ordinary crime, there does not have to be an unjustified delay or lack of 
independence and impartiality just because the state prosecutes an ICC crime as an 
ordinary crime. 
 
As for subparagraph (a), the Court will have to look for indications of a purpose to shield 
the person from criminal responsibility. It must still be unwillingness from the state in a 
particular case, so the key factors would be the intent and the particular prosecution. An 
example of a case that could fall under subparagraph (a) and thus be admissible before the 
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court would be if a conduct would fall within the definition of ‘pillage’58 as a war crime 
under the Statute, but the perpetrator was only sentenced for theft in the national judiciary. 
In such a case, the gravity of the crimes and the sentencing would be so disproportionate 
that the unwillingness criteria could be triggered,59 provided the Court finds an intent to 
shield the prosecuted.  
 
In the scenario where the state finds it impossible to prosecute the state has conducted a 
thorough and genuine investigation, but has had to realise that it cannot prosecute as the 
conduct has not been criminalized in its national legislation. There is therefore no intent to 
shield the perpetrator in the particular case and the case will not be admissible on this 
ground. Similarly, in the scenario where a state has prosecuted for an ordinary crime, there 
is no intention of shielding the accused. In fact, the state is, under this scenario, genuinely 
attempting to bring the accused to justice pursuant to substantive rules available in its 
national jurisdiction. The lacking implementation, as such, can not alone determine that the 
state is unwilling. 
 
In light of the above, we can conclude that the two scenarios under consideration will not 
render a case admissible to the Court on the basis of it being unwilling to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute. The lacking implementation, as such, can not alone determine that 
the state is unwilling. 
 
This does of course not prevent the Court from determining the state unwilling to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute on other grounds.  
 
5.3 Inability 
 
                                                 
58 Article 8 (2) (b) (xvi) of the Statute 
59 Kleffner (2003) 
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The second criteria included in article 17 of the Statute by which the ICC may determine 
the admissibility of a case is the inability of the state concerned to genuinely investigate or 
prosecute. What I will seek to establish in this part of the paper is whether the scenario 
where it is impossible for the state to prosecute, or the scenario where the state prosecutes 
for an ordinary crime may amount to a situation of inability.  
 
The term ‘inability’ is defined in article 17 (3).60 The paragraph sets forth two cumulative 
criteria. First, there must be a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of the national 
judicial system, and second, the state must be unable to obtain the accused, the necessary 
evidence or testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. In addition, there 
has to be a connection between the first condition and the second condition. Only if the 
collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system causes the inability to carry out its 
proceedings will the state be considered unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. 
 
Article 17 (3) reads as follows: 
 
 3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider 
whether due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence 
and testimony or otherwise unable carry out its proceedings. 
 
The inability criterion involves, like the unwillingness criterion, a very politically sensitive 
assessment. By determining unwillingness of the state, the Court will accuse the state of 
deception and by determining the inability of the state; the Court will pass a qualitative 
judgement upon the national judicial system. States will avoid both labels if they can, and 
to maintain the sovereignty of the states,61 both assessments must be applied most 
rigorously. As a group of experts set up by the ICC’s office of the Prosecutor has stated:  
 
                                                 
60 The paragraph does not expressly state that it is a definition, but the list is considered exhaustive, and will 
thus be a definition.  
61 Cassese (2003) page 58. 
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“The standard for showing inability should be a stringent one, as the ICC is not a 
human rights monitoring body, and its role is not to ensure perfect procedures and 
compliance with all international standards.”62 
 
The situation of inability does, unlike the situation of unwillingness, not refer to a specific 
case, but rather to the general situation in the state in question.  
 
I will first analyse whether the two scenarios under scrutiny will amount to a collapse or 
unavailability of the national judicial system. 
 
The idea of collapse refers to failure in the judicial system which prevents it from 
functioning normally. The concept was inserted to take into account the situations such as a 
state of chaos due to civil war or natural disasters, or any other event which leads to public 
disorder.63 Article 17 (3) opens for two different kinds of collapses; both the total collapse 
and the substantial collapse will be sufficient. Total collapse refers to a situation where 
there is a breakdown of the judicial system in the whole territory. Substantial collapse on 
the other hand is a more uncertain term, but at least it requires that there is a considerable 
impact on the national judicial system 
 
The two scenarios do not fall under those descriptions, and hence does not constitute a case 
of collapse of the national judicial system. Both scenarios are built on the postulation that 
the national judicial system is generally effective and there is no armed conflict or any 
other similar situation to cause the effect which is required to cause a ‘collapse’. 
 
As stated above, the Court has to establish, either a collapse or an ‘unavailability’ in the 
national judicial system to determine the case admissible before the ICC. I will thus move 
on to analyse whether the two scenarios will constitute a situation of unavailability for the 
national judicial system.  
                                                 
62 Agirre et al. (2003)  
63 Terracino (2007) 
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 There is no agreed definition of the term ‘unavailability of a judicial system’, but it is held 
by several scholars that it should be given a broad interpretation, so as to cover a wide 
range of inability scenarios.64 Examples of what is suggested that should be included is lack 
of necessary personnel, judges, investigators or prosecutors, lack of judicial infrastructure, 
or lack of substantive and criminal legislation.65 While the first alternative requirement 
‘collapse’ refers to an exceptional situation, ‘unavailability’ refers to more general 
situations that may be permanent, and which renders the national judicial system unsuitable 
or incapable of handling proceedings. 
 
The scenario where it is impossible to prosecute clearly falls within the concept of 
unavailability of the national judicial system. If a state has not implemented or harmonised 
the definitions of the ICC crimes into its domestic legislation, and for that reason declares 
that it can not prosecute the case despite investigations, the state’s national judicial system 
is unavailable. We can therefore conclude that the lack of substantive criminal legislation is 
an example of unavailability. And furthermore, if there are shortcomings in the legislative 
framework which makes it impossible to prosecute, the Court may, pursuant to article 17 
(3) of the Statute, determine that the national judicial system is unavailable.  
 
Whether the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary crime leads to the national 
judicial system being unavailable is less clear. If a state decides to prosecute for an 
ordinary crime because its laws do not contain the Statute’s definitions of genocide, crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, its judicial system will be unsuitable or inappropriate, 
while unavailability seems to imply a situation of impossibility. However, the legislative 
framework in a state that prosecutes for ordinary crimes instead of the ICC crimes might 
vary from the most comprehensive and pertinent ones to some rather inappropriate ones.  
 
                                                 
64 Agirre et al. (2003) 
65 Agirre et al. (2003) 
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Nevertheless, a conclusion regarding the admissibility on the grounds of inability for either 
of the scenarios can not be reached until after we have analysed article 17 (3) in its entirety. 
The second condition set up by article 17 (3) is that the collapse or unavailability of the 
national judicial system has, in a specific proceeding, caused the state to be ‘unable to 
contain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings’. Hence, there has to be a causal connection between the general 
situation of collapse or unavailability in the national judicial system and the inability of the 
state to prosecute in the particular case. 
 
Inability to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony is relatively easy to 
establish for the Court. However, during the drafting of the Statute, some delegations were 
concerned that only including that criteria as a basis for inability could limit the Courts 
capacity to act and thus prevent the overriding aim of the Statute. As a result, they added 
the phrase “or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”, and thus lowered the 
threshold for determining inability. 
 
In the impossible to prosecute scenario, it is clear that the state is unable to prosecute, and 
that inability is directly derived from the unavailability of the national judicial system. As a 
result, we can conclude that in a case where the state declares that it can not prosecute the 
alleged perpetrator, because it has not criminalized the certain conduct which is within the 
definition of an ICC crime, the Court would be able to admit that case on the basis of a 
state’s inability to genuinely prosecute.66 
 
As for the prosecution for ordinary crimes scenario, it is equally clear that it does not fulfil 
the second condition for determining the inability of the state to genuinely prosecute. By 
prosecuting for ordinary crimes, the state is carrying out proceedings, and is thus not 
unable to do exactly that. It will therefore not matter, in the inability criterion, at what level 
                                                 
66This has also been claimed by several scholars such as Terracino (2007) and Kleffner (2003). The claim was 
however seemingly disputed by Colombia in their declaration made upon ratification: “Colombia declares 
that the use of the word ‘otherwise’ with respect to the determination of the State’s ability to investigate or 
prosecute a case refers to the obvious absence of objective conditions necessary to conduct the trial.” (source:  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/909EEAAE157FBD43412566E100542BDE?OpenDocument) 
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of comprehensives and pertinence the national judicial system is at. As long as the state 
prosecutes the same conduct which would constitute an ICC crime for an ordinary crime, at 
whatever gravity, the case will not be admissible before the Court by this criterion. 
Consequently, the scenario where states prosecute for ordinary crimes will not result in a 
situation where the Court would be able to admit the case on the basis of a state’s inability 
to genuinely prosecute. 
 
In sum, the scenario where it is impossible for the state to prosecute would, pursuant to 
article 17 (3) of the Statute, amount to inability of the state to genuinely prosecute. The 
prosecution for ordinary crimes scenario however, will not, pursuant to article 17 (3) of the 
Statute, amount to a situation where the state is unable to genuinely prosecute.  
 
I will therefore move on to analyse whether the prosecute for ordinary crimes scenario still 
could provide situations where the case would be admissible before the Court, or if the 
principle of ne bis in idem prevents that from occuring. 
 
 
5.4 Ne bis in idem 
 
The principle of ne bis in idem is found in different forms in different systems, but it has 
the same function, namely to prevent a person being prosecuted for the same conduct 
twice. While the ‘horizontal’ ne bis in idem principle refers to the relationship between two 
states, the ‘vertical’ ne bis in idem principle refers to the situation between national courts 
and international tribunals.67 The relevant side of the principle for this paper is the vertical 
side of the principle, when a national court has acquitted or convicted the person.  
 
                                                 
67 Van den Wyngaert (2002) page 708 and 709. The same relationships are referred to as the ’internal’ ne bis 
in idem principle and the ’international’ ne bis in idem principle in Cassese (2003) page 319. 
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This side of the principle is reflected in article 20 (3) of the Statute. Accordingly, I will 
have to assess whether the Court can find the case, which has already been prosecuted in 
national judicial systems as an ordinary crime, admissible. Otherwise, the national 
proceedings will be considered final. 
 
Article 20 (3) reads as follows: 
 
3. No person who has been tried by any other court for conduct also 
prescribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the 
same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: 
 
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
 
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law 
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
 
The first question which needs to be addressed is whether the national proceeding of an 
ordinary crime will amount to a proceeding by the standards of article 20 of the Statute. 
Only then will the principle of ne bis in idem be relevant. This question must be answered 
affirmatively. In the scenario where a state prosecutes for an ordinary crime, a thorough 
national investigation and prosecution has taken place for the same conduct, but of an 
ordinary crime rather than an ICC crime.  
 
The Court will thus only be able to admit a case under this scenario if the national 
proceeding falls within one of the exceptions under article 20 (3) of the Statute. 
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The exceptions contained in article 20 (3) refer to the same conditions as provided for in 
the unwillingness criterion in article 17 (2) (a) and (c). I have already established that none 
of the alternatives in article 17 were applicable for this scenario. They require an intent 
from the state to shield the alleged perpetrator, and that is not the case in the scenario 
where the state decides to prosecute for an ordinary crime. A situation where a national 
prosecuting for an ordinary crime could fall within the exceptions of article 20 (3) would be 
if the conduct would fall within the definition of genocide of the ICC Statute, but the 
national prosecution was for assault. The national charge must manifestly not conform to 
the conduct before the Court will determine such an intent to exist, and this is not the 
postulation which the scenario is based on. 
 
The drafting history behind article 20 (3) of the Statute also confirms the interpretation that 
prosecuting for ordinary crimes does not amount to one of the exceptions listed in that 
article. A national prosecution for ordinary crimes would not prevent the ICTY or the ICTR 
from determining the case admissible according to their Statutes article 10 (2) (a) and 9 (2) 
(a) respectively. This procedure was also suggested continued with the ICC by the ILC 
Draft Statute article 42 (2) (a). However, such a rule proved highly controversial and 
disputed in the drafting work. Some delegations feared that the accused could be 
prosecuted twice simply because of the categorization of the criminalized conduct. As a 
result, in 1998 the Preparatory Committee deleted the suggestion. 
 
Consequently, a prosecution for an ordinary crime within the national judicial system must 
be considered a finalised proceeding preventing a second trial on the basis of the ne bin is 
idem principle. And furthermore, none of the exceptions pursuant to article 20 (3) of the 
Statute will apply. In fact, as it was expressly excluded as an exception, we can establish 
that the Court would not be able to prosecute an accused after he or she was prosecuted in 
national jurisdictions for ordinary crimes without violating the principle of ne bis in idem. 
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6 The impact of complementarity on national implementation  
 
I have now shown how different strategies of national implementation chosen by the States 
influence the admissibility before the Court. In this part, I will apply the conclusions 
reached in the previous parts and analyse how the principle of complementarity influences 
the states choice of implementation strategy.  
 
To sum up, what I have shown in the previous parts is that states implement the ICC crimes 
into their substantive law as the principle of legality would otherwise prevent them from 
enforcing the prosecution of these crimes. If states decide not to implement, they risk 
finding themselves in the scenario where it is impossible for them to prosecute a case 
which falls within the definition of one of the ICC crimes. This means that the ICC will 
have jurisdiction over the case and it will be determined admissible before the Court due to 
the states inability to prosecute.  
 
It is therefore imperative that the States Parties to the Rome Statute take into consideration 
the possible scenarios they could encounter if they do not implement when revising their 
criminal codes. If they decide to implement the ICC crimes word for word, or even expand 
the scope of the international crimes, there will be no problem with the legislation as such. 
If, however, the states decides to implement a more narrow definition of the ICC crimes, or 
not implement the ICC crimes at all, they will be in the same situation as presented under 
part 4.3 and 4.4 of this paper. Hence, they will most probably face a scenario where they 
are able to prosecute for an ordinary crime, but they may also be faced with the scenario 
where it is impossible for the state to prosecute as the act is not criminalized at all in its 
national judicial system. These scenarios will therefore be relevant, and I will continue to 
use them in this part. 
 
First I will briefly explain how the complementary nature of the ICC works as an incentive 
for states to implement the ICC Crimes into their national legislation. I will then move on 
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to discuss whether or not states are obliged by the complementary nature of the Court to 
implement the ICC crimes. 
 
6.1 Complementarity as an incentive to implement the ICC crimes. 
 
The principle motivation underlying the complementary regime of the Statute is to respect 
state sovereignty as much as possible,68 and the most significant way complementarity 
works as an incentive for States Parties to implement the ICC crimes into their national 
legislation, is their wish to prevent an international body from interfering with their 
sovereignty.  
 
It is uncontested that the jurisdictional function (the function of jus dicere, ‘to tell the law’), 
either civil or criminal, is considered an important part of a state’s sovereignty.69 Unless 
the States Parties implement the ICC crimes, they risk finding themselves in the scenario 
where it is impossible to prosecute. They will be obliged to surrender their own nationals to 
the Court, even if the person has not violated any national criminal code.70 States Parties 
wishing to safeguard their sovereignty will thus have a clear incentive to implement the 
ICC crimes. 
 
This incentive has clearly motivated several states. One of the objectives for implementing 
the ICC crimes into the German domestic law was  
 
“(…) to ensure, in the light of the complementary prosecutorial competence of the 
International Criminal Court, that Germany is always able to prosecute crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC (…)”.71 
                                                 
68 Cassese (2003) page 351. 
69 Goia (2006) page 1096. 
70 Cf. part 9 of the Statute. 
71 Translated by Kleffner (2003). Original document is found at: http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-
/143/Einfuehrung%20Voelkerstrafgesetzbuch.pdf. Norway has also found this incentive as a major reason to 
implement the ICC crimes stating that: “For kommisjonen har det vært avgjørende at man ved å innføre egne 
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 Implementation in this way will also benefit the states by strengthening their national 
criminal justice system by promoting conformity with other international obligations and 
bringing them up to date with important developments in international law. Even third 
party states appreciate this part of the complementary nature of the ICC. The Department of 
Treaty and Law of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has noted that the “most 
important role of the International Criminal Court is expressed in that it promotes all 
countries to improve their domestic judicial systems”.72 
 
Another reason why the individual state will want to secure jurisdiction over the 
international crimes is to secure the success of the ICC in ending impunity for the 
perpetrators of ICC crimes. The total capacity of the Court does not match the potential 
number of ICC crimes. In the 2004 budget for the ICC, the assumption adopted by the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Assembly) was that the Court would have a constant docket of three cases, and it would 
not reach this number before 2010.73 Today there are four cases before the ICC74, and 
projections seem to indicate that the number is more likely to increase than to decrease. 
The states may thus aid the Court by relieving the Court of the majority of cases. 
 
Lacking or non-existing implementation, which may lead to more cases being brought 
before the Court, and thus strains the budget of the Court, will also work as an incentive for 
States Parties to implement in other ways. First, it is in the interest of all states that the 
prosecutor of the ICC (Prosecutor) acts independently so as to maintain his integrity. 
Recent developments show that the Assembly has made budgetary determinations which 
may question the independence of the Prosecutor. For example, the Assembly made cuts in 
                                                                                                                                                    
straffebud som dekker art 6, 7 og 8 I Roma-vedtektene, unngår at det blir stilt spørsmål ved norske 
myndighters vilje eller evne til strafforfølgning på dette området.” NOU 2002: 4 Ny straffelov kapittel 9.2. 
72 See China and the International Criminal Court, Department of Treaty and Law (MFA). Available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2627/t15473.htm (last visited October 2007) China has 
not signed the Statute. 
73 O’Donohue (2005) 
74 http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html  
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the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division which the Prosecutor 
established in 2004.75 A less strained budget would perhaps grant the Prosecutor more 
independence. Furthermore, as a clearer incentive, it is the States Parties which cover the 
expenses incurred by the Court, and it will be less expensive in the long run for each State 
if the most possible number of cases are tried at a national level.  
 
States may also wish to secure national jurisdiction over the ICC crimes as the national 
judicial organs might be better equipped to try a particular case due to their connection with 
the perpetrator, the location etc. A state which finds itself in the scenario where it is 
impossible to prosecute, will not have the possibility to assess this possible advantage. 
Furthermore, by implementing, the state will in fact have an option as to whether the 
national judicial organs or the ICC is better equipped to consider the case, as States Parties 
have the possibility to refer cases to the Court according to article 14 of the Statute.76  This 
is, however, an uncertain option at best as there is no guarantee that the Prosecutor will 
consider the case to hold sufficient gravity pursuant to article 17 (1) (d), nor have the 
capacity to handle it.  
 
Before hearing a case, the Court will have to determine whether or not the case is 
admissible before the Court.77 In regard to the scenario where it is impossible for the state 
to prosecute, I have shown in part 5.3 that a case will be admissible as the State Party will 
be ‘unable’ to carry out a genuine prosecution. This represents another incentive for States 
Parties to implement the international crimes into their judicial system. Any state will seek 
to avoid having their judicial system being labelled ‘unable’ to carry out prosecutions for 
the most heinous crimes known to mankind.78 This is an incentive that is specific to the 
complementary principle as a primary international jurisdiction would have priority 
regardless of the adequacy of the national effort. 
 
                                                 
75 O’Donohue (2005) 
76 See for instance ICC-01/04-01/06 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
77 Cf. Article 17 of the Statute. 
78 Benzing and Bergsmo refer to this as the ’Embarresment factor’. Benzing, 2004. 
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An incentive for States Parties to implement the ICC crimes instead of relying on its 
existing criminalized ordinary crimes is through the understanding that e.g. an act of 
genocide should be labelled as genocide and punished accordingly. Prosecuting a case of 
genocide as a murder case should not be considered an adequate solution. In the transferral 
case Prosecutor v. Bagarzarga of 19. May 2006 held by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, Norway requested a case of genocide transferred from the ICTR and to 
Norwegian courts. The ICTR did not consider the Norwegian judicial system adequate as 
the case would have to be tried as a murder case in Norway due to Norway’s lacking 
implementation of ICC crimes.  
 
Such a national proceeding would, however, not make the case admissible before the ICC. 
Despite having a poor solution legislation wise, the state would still not be considered 
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute pursuant to article 17 of the Statute. Assuming 
that states wish to label and punish the ICC crimes according to the gravity of the conduct, 
this should still be a clear incentive for states. 
 
Finally, it must be recognised that the social and political reconciliation process in the 
aftermath of a conflict, which has included violations of ICC crimes, will be very delicate 
and vulnerable. Whether an international or a national prosecution will serve the purpose of 
justice and reconciliation best will depend upon the situation.79 States which have 
implemented the ICC crimes will be able to decide whether to prosecute the case 
domestically or try to refer it to the Court pursuant to article 14 of the Statute states which 
find themselves in the scenario where it is impossible to prosecute, however, will only see 
the perpetrators punished if the case is brought before the Court.  
 
 
                                                 
79 Berkeley scientists Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein illustrate this in their selected studies regarding the 
nationals of Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia and their faith in the ICTR and ICTY respectively. Their 
conclusion is that in Rwanda especially, the national population has much confidence in the national judicial 
system, but very little confidence in the ICTR. Stover (2004). 
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6.2 National implementation of ICC crimes as a legal obligation 
 
In light of the aforementioned reactions of states to the complementary nature of the ICC 
and the importance of national implementation of international crimes, the question arises 
as to whether there is an obligation for States Party to implement the ICC crimes into their 
national legislation. 
 
The mandate of the drafters of the Rome Statute was to build on existing international law; 
not develop new penal provisions, only codify custom. The ICC crimes were therefore 
recognised as international law even before the Statute was adopted and entered into force. 
For some of these, a clear obligation to implement the ICC crimes into domestic legislation 
can be derived from various treaties,80 while customary laws may impose such an 
obligation for others. The Statute leaves these obligations intact as it does not limit or 
prejudice any existing international law.81  
 
The Statute does not expressly require States Parties to implement the ICC crimes into their 
domestic penal code. This is in contrast to many other conventions which concern criminal 
conduct.82 What I seek to assess in this part of the paper is whether the principle of 
complementarity ‘in itself’83 imposes such an obligation. This would be an obligation to 
implement the crimes described in articles 6 through 8 in the Statute, regardless of whether 
the state has ratified the other treaties which introduces similar obligations. 
 
                                                 
80 For the crime of genocide: Article V of the 1948 Genocide Convention; for war crimes: Articles 49, 50, 
129 and 146 of the Four 1949 Geneva Conventions and Articles 85-87 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions; for some of the crimes against humanity: Article IV of the 1973 Apartheid 
Convention and Article 6 of the UN Torture Convention. 
81 Cf. Article 10, the Statute. 
82 An example could be the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) 
83 By the principle of complementarity ‘in itself’ I mean the nature of the principle as it is presented in the 
Statute. The conclusion will therefore be based upon an interpretation of the parts of the Statute which 
concern the principle of complementarity. Other grounds for a possible obligation fall outside the scope of 
this thesis. See for instance Goia (2006) where he claims an obligation exists as an ‘erga omnes’ or 
‘community obligation’. 
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As shown above in Part 4.1, national implementation of the ICC crimes will ensure 
national jurisdiction over the crimes which is essential for the principle of 
complementarity. Unless complementarity establishes such an obligation, States Parties are 
free to choose not to implement the ICC crimes, while they at the same time have granted 
jurisdiction to the Court. They would thus face the two scenarios presented in part 4.3 and 
4.4, namely the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary crime instead of the 
ICC crime and the scenario where the state finds it impossible to prosecute due to the lack 
of applicable ordinary crimes.  
 
It must be noted that the States Parties have to a large extent responded to their ratification 
of the Statute by implementing the ICC crimes into their national judicial system84. This is 
an evident eagerness to fulfil the principle of complementarity.  
 
Some states have in their process of implementing the ICC crimes expressly claimed that it 
is a part of their obligation derived from the Statute.85 Other states however, have stressed 
that their ratification of the Statute did not incur any obligations to alter their jurisdiction.86 
Also academic writers have different views regarding this question.87  
 
                                                 
84 See part 4 of this paper.. 
85 For an example of opinio juris pro an obligation see the Dutch Explanatory Memorandum (Memorie van  
Toelichting) on the substantive implementing legislation (Wet Internationale Misdrijven) which has been 
translated by Kleffner (2003) into: ‘Although not expressly provided for in the Statute, the majority of States 
– including the Kingdom – were always of the opinion that the principle of complementarity entails that 
States parties to the Statute are obliged to criminalise the crimes that are subject to the International Criminal 
Court’s jurisdiction in their national laws and furthermore to establish extra-territorial, universal jurisdiction 
which enables their national criminal courts to adjudicate these crimes even if they have been committed 
abroad by a foreign national.’ Source: Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 337, nr. 3 (MvT) pp. 2 and 18. 
(Emphasis added)  
86 Opinio juris contra an obligation held by States party to the Statute include Spain cf. the Spanish Progress 
Report on ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute to the Council of Europe delivered in 2001: 
‘[…] strictly speaking, the statute does not include any obligation on the part of the States parties to 
incorporate those criminal provisions into their internal law, as they only concern the scope and exercise of 
the jurisdiction of the Court.’ *SOURCE* Also France and Belgium have expressly rejected that 
implementation of the substantive law is an obligation after the Rome Statute. *SOURCE* 
87 Contra an obligation to implement see for instance: Hay (2004) or Robinson (2002). For the opposite view, 
see for instance: Roscini (2007), Yang (2005), Sluiter (2004), Relva (2003) and Philips (1999). 
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As stated in part 2.2, the codified principles of treaty interpretation as presented articles 31-
33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will be relevant when 
interpreting the provisions of the Statute which relates to the principle of complementarity. 
The Vienna Convention will thus be the basis for my interpretation and conclusion in this 
part. 
 
In compliance with the Vienna Convention article 31 (1), any interpretation of an 
international treaty should start with the wording of its approved text. And as stated above, 
no clear and express obligation is provided for in the Statute. This absence militates against 
the existence of such an obligation. So does the fact that the Statute states express 
obligations on States Party to implement cooperative legislation and to criminalize offences 
against the administration of the justice in its articles 70 (4) (a) and 88. 
  
However, the absence of an express obligation from the treaty text can not be the 
determining factor alone. There is no rule or principle of international law that prohibits 
implied obligations to be inferred from a treaty text. On the contrary, there are several 
examples where international courts or quasi-judicial organs have deduced obligations as a 
necessary consequence of a treaty text.88 As for the national implementation of the ICC 
crimes, there are several arguments that support that the complementarity principle implies 
an obligation to implement the ICC crimes.  
 
(1) Contextual interpretation 
 
The first argument in favour of an obligation on states to implement the ICC crimes is the 
contextual interpretation of the provisions of the Statute regarding the complementarity 
principle. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention lists the contextual interpretation (“in their 
context”) as an essential aspect of treaty interpretation, together with the ordinary meaning 
of the text and the teleological interpretation (“in light of its object and purpose”).  
                                                 
88 Kleffner (2003). One typical example is the doctrine of implied powers as developed with respect to the 
powers of international organisations.  
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 The term ‘context’ includes, according to article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention, in 
addition to the surrounding text, the treaty’s “preamble and annexes”. The preambular 
paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute recalls that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”. This duty can 
however, only be carried out if the state has established jurisdiction to prosecute for the 
particular conduct. This duty will be achieved through the scenario where the state 
prosecutes for an ordinary crime, but it will not be achieved in the scenario where it is 
impossible for the state to prosecute. 
 
The only way to secure that no States Parties experience the scenario where it is impossible 
for them to prosecute, and thus cannot fulfil their duty after preambular paragraph 6, is thus 
to interpret complementarity as an obligation for states to implement the ICC crimes into 
their national legislation.  
 
(2) Teleological interpretation 
 
A teleological interpretation of the complementarity provisions equally supports this 
conclusion. Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention identifies a treaty’s object and purpose 
as an important interpretational factor. The primary source for finding the object and 
purpose of a convention such as the Rome Statute is, according to article 31 (2) of the 
Vienna Convention, the preambular clauses.89  
 
The Statute affirms in its preamble paragraph 4 “that the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation”. This acknowledges the fact that the Court neither practically nor 
politically will be able to handle all future international crimes. Preamble paragraph 5 goes 
                                                 
89Regarding the relevance of the Preamble the ECHR noted in Golder v. The United Kingdom para. 34 that 
“the Preamble is generally very useful for the determinationof the ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ of the instrument to 
be construed”. 
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on to confirm that the objective of the ICC supplemented by effective national prosecutions 
is to achieve the ultimate purpose of putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
international crimes, and thus prevent these crimes from being committed. 
 
In light of the abovementioned objects and purposes of the ICC, the assertion found in 
Preambular paragraph 10 that the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdiction” can only be interpreted as the establishment of a system of criminal law 
enforcement which places the primary responsibility upon the States Parties. In a system 
like this, the very objective can only be achieved if the prosecutions have the necessary 
deterrent effect. This effect will be undermined if states decide not to implement the ICC 
crimes so as to fully criminalise conduct punishable under the Statute. 
 
If several states decided not to adequately implement the ICC crimes and thus experience 
the scenario where it is impossible for the state to prosecute, the Court will (due to its 
limited capacity) have to confine itself to a rather restricted number of cases, and it will not 
be able to rely on enforcement through states. The crimes in question are typically 
committed at a level and scale which involves a considerable number of perpetrators. 
Unless an effective national enforcement mechanism is in place, the prosecution would 
probably appear random and the deterrent effect of the ICC would be diminished and the 
purpose of the Statute would be undermined. 
 
The deterrent effect of the international criminal law will also be undermined if states 
decide to use their ordinary crimes for future cases of violations of ‘genocide’, war crimes’ 
and ‘crimes against humanity’.  
 
For example, if a case of genocide was prosecuted before Norwegian courts today, the 
perpetrator would have to be prosecuted for ordinary crimes such as murder or assault and 
battery depending upon the situation. Not only are the offences of far less gravity, but the 
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possible sentencing might not match the gravity of the case and the perpetrator’s criminal 
liability will be obsolete after 15 or 25 years90.  
 
Furthermore, an absent or inadequate national legislation would run counter the 
complementary nature of the ICC. The ICC can only be effective as a complementary 
judicial organ if the majority of State Party implement the Statutes substantive law to the 
extent that is required for the purpose of national prosecution. If no obligation to implement 
the ICC crimes exists for the State Party, the Court might in fact become the court of first 
instance, in addition to being the only one, instead of being a permanent reserve court as 
envisaged by the principle of complementarity. Comprehensive national implementation of 
international crimes is therefore an indispensable element for the principle of 
complementarity to function efficiently.  
 
If all States Parties did, in fact, implement the ICC crimes into their national legislation, 
they would still have to genuinely investigate and prosecute the particular case in order 
prevent cases being admissible before the Court. An obligation to implement would, thus, 
not necessarily mean that the Court would be redundant. It would still have a deterrent 
effect upon states to investigate and prosecute its crimes genuinely. Furthermore, the 
success of the Court should not be measured by how many cases it exercises jurisdiction 
over itself, but rather by how seldom perpetrators of these crimes achieve impunity.91 
 
It can therefore be argued that to interpret the provisions on complementarity so as to give 
them the fullest weight and effect consistent with the ICC’s functions involves an 
obligation on States Parties to secure national jurisdiction to the extent which is required 
for the purpose of national prosecution. 
 
However, it is only in the scenario where the states find it impossible to prosecute as they 
have not criminalized the conduct at all which will necessarily contradict the object and 
                                                 
90 The Norwegian Criminal Code section 67. 
91 Paragraph 5 of the preambular clauses. 
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purpose of the Statute. And it is must be acknowledged that this scenario will occur much 
less frequently than the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary crime. 
Perpetrators of international crimes in the latter scenario will be prosecuted regardless of an 
implementation process. The scenario where states prosecute for an ordinary crime will 
therefore not contradict the principle of complementarity in most cases. Nevertheless, 
prosecution for ordinary crimes will seldom reflect the gravity of the acts performed by the 
perpetrator and must for that reason not viewed as a preferable situation. 
 
States which have to prosecute for ordinary crimes can combat this by the way the courts 
formulate their grounds for the judgement. Again, if Norway had to deal with a case of 
genocide, it would be prosecuted and punished as murder. However, there is nothing 
preventing the judges from stating, in the judgement, that what has really taken place is a 
case of what is internationally labelled as ‘genocide’. This would be an aggravating factor 
when meting out the severity of the punishment according to Norwegian law. Other States 
will have similar opportunities. 
 
The teleological interpretation still favours an obligation to implement the ICC crimes, but 
the possibilities within the scenario where states prosecute for ordinary crimes somewhat 
downplays the strength of the argument.   
 
(3) Subsequent practice 
 
Another argument in favour of an obligation for States Parties to implement the ICC crimes 
is the subsequent practice of the states. Vienna Convention article 31 (3) (b) states that 
“any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation” shall be taken into account when interpreting a 
treaty.  
 
The preparatory works to the Vienna Convention contained the term ‘understanding’ rather 
than ‘agreement’ and this alteration occurred only to adjust the wording in accordance with 
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the other language versions of the treaty, rather than to give the expression a different 
meaning. It is therefore maintained that a consensus that does not amount to a legally 
binding agreement could still be an interpreting factor. 92  
 
In the case of the implementation of the ICC crimes, the subsequent practice has been that 
approximately 70 % of the States Party have already, or are in the process of, implementing 
the ICC crimes into their domestic legislation. The trend is also clear that when a state 
Party implements its cooperative legislation as it is expressly obliged to in accordance with 
the Statute’s article 88,93 the state also implements or begins to implement the international 
crimes into its substantive legislation. This has been the subsequent procedure of 67 out of 
the 71 states that have implemented or begun implementing the cooperative legislation, and 
the work has been given a high priority.  
 
The subsequent procedure must therefore be considered strong enough to constitute a 
uniform consensus that the ICC crimes must be implemented. This supports the argument 
that complementarity should be interpreted as establishing an obligation for States Party to 
implement the ICC crimes into their national legislation.  
 
(5) Conclusion 
 
Despite the significant number of strong arguments in favour of an obligation for States 
Parties to implement the ICC crimes can be derived from the complementary nature of the 
ICC, the conclusion will ultimately depend upon whether one favours a more textual or a 
more purposive interpretive approach. I favour the more textual interpretive approach, and 
do not believe that states are obliged to implement the ICC crimes. The terms of a treaty 
are by far the most important source for interpreting the treaty, and an obligation for States 
Parties to alter their legislation should be expressly stated. Furthermore, the subsequent 
practice of implementing the ICC crimes has not been identical among states, as different 
                                                 
92 Kleffner (2003) footnote 26 with further references.  
93 Article 88 of the Statute expressly states that all States Party are obliged to implement cooperative 
legislation in accordance with part 9 of the Statute. Whether this constitutes an obligation is not disputed. 
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strategies have been used. As I have shown in part 4 some States Parties have implemented 
a more restricted definition than in the Statute, while others have implemented the exact 
definition or even expanded it. If one then were to conclude that an obligation to implement 
the ICC crimes follows from the principle of complementarity, the exact content of this 
obligation would be uncertain.  
 
Also, I have concluded that to prosecute for ordinary crimes at national level does not in 
and of itself warrant the finding of a case admissible. It would therefore be artificial to 
interpret an implicit obligation out of a principle, which demands more than the standard 
set forth by the same principle. 
 
Furthermore, accession states are not required to implement the ICC crimes before they 
become parties to the Statute. In fact, the best thing that could happen to the ICC would be 
that all states of the world ratified the Statute and thus agreed to put an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of the worst crimes known to mankind, regardless of the level of national 
criminal legislation. And in that respect, the complementarity principle will have a bigger 
impact in states which have a poor criminal judicial system.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the principle of complementarity does not imply an obligation for 
States Parties to implement the ICC crimes as defined in the Statute, the incentives as 
described in part 6.1 remain relevant. This should encourage states to go through with an 
implementation process, so as to secure their jurisdiction over these crimes. Considering 
the rate at which States Parties are implementing the ICC crimes, the question as to 
whether an obligation does exists, may over time become superfluous.  
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7 Concluding remarks 
 
Studies into national implementing processes show that states which ratify the Rome 
Statute are likely to begin implementing the ICC crimes into their national legislation, 
aspiring to avoid a situation of unwillingness or inability to prosecute ICC crimes. An 
adequate implementing process which closely follows the definitions of the Statute will 
secure the state criminal substantive jurisdiction to prosecute the same crimes as the ICC.  
 
However, some States Parties have not yet implemented one, or more, of the ICC crimes 
into their national legislation, while others have defined the ICC crimes under the national 
law in narrower terms than provided for by the Statute. As this paper has shown, if these 
states wish to prosecute and punish persons for violating conduct described in an ICC 
crime, they will face one of two scenarios. Most probably, they will be able to prosecute for 
an ordinary crime which covers the same conduct. Alternatively, they might find it 
impossible to prosecute as they lack the substantive jurisdiction to prosecute nationally.  
 
As argued throughout this paper, the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary 
crime will not be admissible before the Court. It does not, in itself, constitute unwillingness 
nor inability of the state to genuinely prosecute, and hence, due to the principle of ne bis in 
idem, the Court will not determine such a scenario admissible. 
 
Any case under the other scenario, where the state finds it impossible to prosecute, will on 
the other hand amount to the state being unable to genuinely prosecute pursuant to article 
17 of the Statute. The Court would thus determine the case admissible.  
 
This then answers two of the questions asked in the introduction. For a state to maintain its 
jurisdiction and thus avoid failing the admissibility test, it would suffice to criminalize the 
same conduct as defined in the Rome Statute. The state does, in regard to the admissibility 
assessment, not have to implement own provisions criminalizing ‘genocide’, ‘war crimes’ 
and ‘crimes against humanity’ as long as the particular conduct is criminalized elsewhere. 
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States with the most meticulous criminal legal systems are therefore likely to maintain 
substantive jurisdiction even without an implementation process. Most states will, however, 
have to make adjustments in their criminal legislation. 
 
It should be mentioned again that in a real case, the admissibility test would look at more 
factors than the national legislation which could result in a case being admissible even if 
the state prosecuted for an ordinary crime. 
 
The paper has also argued that the principle of complementarity does not imply an 
obligation upon States Parties to implement the ICC. This was the third question asked in 
the introduction. It is therefore neither a need nor an obligation for the States Parties to 
implement the ICC crimes into their national legislation, in regard to the principle of 
complementarity. 
 
The paper has, however, discussed why a state should still implement the ICC crimes 
despite the aforementioned conclusions.  
 
Only through an adequate national jurisdiction secured through their legislation will the 
international criminal judicial system achieve the necessary deterrent effect. The Court will 
only be able to handle a fraction of all future cases of violations to the ICC crimes. It is 
therefore imperative that the states prosecute international crimes in their own national 
judicial systems. And as shown, this can only be done through adequate national 
jurisdiction secured through their legislation. 
 
It must be acknowledged that although prosecutions of ordinary crimes will put an end 
impunity for the perpetrators of the ICC crimes. But the ordinary crimes might be of far 
lesser gravity. Thus, the scenario where the state prosecutes for an ordinary crime is not a 
desirable one. 
 
 53
It is therefore in the interest of both the single state as well as the international criminal 
justice system that the state implements the ICC crimes regardless of whether an obligation 
to do so exists. 
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